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Abstract
Background: Doctors' professional behaviour is influenced by the way they are paid. When GPs are paid per
item, i.e., on a fee-for-service basis (FFS), there is a clear relationship between workload and income: more work
means more money. In the case of capitation based payment, workload is not directly linked to income since the
fees per patient are fixed. In this study list size was considered as an indicator for workload and we investigated
how list size and remuneration affect GP decisions about how they provide consultations. The main objectives of
this study were to investigate a) how list size is related to consultation length, waiting time to get an appointment,
and the likelihood that GPs conduct home visits and b) to what extent the relationships between list size and
these three variables are affected by remuneration.
Methods: List size was used because this is an important determinant of objective workload. List size was
corrected for number of older patients and patients who lived in deprived areas. We focussed on three
dependent variables that we expected to be related to remuneration and list size: consultation length; waiting
time to get an appointment; and home visits. Data were derived from the second Dutch National Survey of
General Practice (DNSGP-2), carried out between 2000 and 2002. The data were collected using electronic
medical records, videotaped consultations and postal surveys. Multilevel regression analyses were performed to
assess the hypothesized relationships.
Results: Our results indicate that list size is negatively related to consultation length, especially among GPs with
relatively large lists. A correlation between list size and waiting time to get an appointment, and a correlation
between list size and the likelihood of a home visit were only found for GPs with small practices. These
correlations are modified by the proportion of patients for whom GPs receive capitation fees. Waiting times to
get an appointment tend to become shorter with increasing patient lists when there is a larger capitation
percentage. The likelihood that GPs will conduct home visit rises with increasing patient lists when the capitation
percentage is small.
Conclusion: Remuneration appears to affect GPs' decisions about how they provide consultations, especially
among GPs with relatively small patient lists. This role is, however, small compared to other factors such as
patient characteristics.
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Background
Time is scarce in general practice. GPs must constantly
choose how best to divide their time: between their
patients, between patient care and other professional
activities, and between their work and their private lives.
These decisions are determined, among other variables,
by their workload and the number of patients served [1-
3]. In systems with fixed patient lists, such as in the Neth-
erlands, list size (the average number of listed patients in
a year) corrected for case mix is a good indicator for work-
load.
GPs' decisions about the provision of care can have
important financial consequences, depending on the way
in which they are paid. It is commonly assumed that the
way in which GPs are remunerated affects their behaviour
[4-12]. When GPs are paid per item, i.e., on a fee-for-serv-
ice basis (FFS), there is a clear relationship between the
amount of work and income. More services generate more
income. In capitation based systems, this relationship is
much weaker, since the annual capitation fee per patient
is fixed. In a salaried system, income is not directly related
to the patient load.
Previous studies have shown that physicians who were
paid under FFS conditions are more likely to have longer
working hours, spend more time on patient-related activ-
ities, have higher contact rates, more treatments that
attract additional remuneration and shorter consulta-
tions, and conduct more home visits. Moreover, any form
of fund holding or capitation was shown to decrease the
total volume of prescriptions written for patients
[8,10,13-15].
Most of these studies were international comparisons or
consisted of research that described the consequences of
changes to the payment system. A problem pertaining to
international comparisons is that besides the remunera-
tion systems, there are many other differences between
countries that are of influence. Boerma points out that lit-
tle research has been undertaken on the effects of payment
systems because it is difficult to investigate this in a single
health care system [15]. The Dutch data we use in this
study, however, provide the unique possibility to investi-
gate the relationship between remuneration and list size,
because until 2006 Dutch GPs were paid on both a capi-
tation-basis and an FFS-basis, depending on the insurance
status of the patient. See appendix 1 for a more detailed
clarification of the Dutch payment system [see additional
file 1]. In this article, we try to gain more insight into the
relationship between remuneration, list size and deci-
sions about how to provide consultations. The main
objectives of this study were to investigate a) how list size
is related to consultation length, waiting time to get an
appointment and the likelihood that GPs do home visits
and b) to what extent the correlations between list size
and these three variables are affected by remuneration. An
important difference vis à vis previous studies is that we
investigate this within a single mixed system, which ena-
bles us to retain unobserved GP and system wide factors.
Hypotheses
A high workload can be managed by 'squeezing' or
'spreading' the work. In the first case the time investment
remains the same while the GP handles more contacts.
This can be done by keeping a close watch on the 'time
budget'; avoiding time-consuming encounters such as
home visits, and preventing an extension of the consulta-
tion length. In the second case, when the work is spread
out, the total time investment rises when workload
becomes higher.
The first relationship that we investigate is that between
the list size and consultation length. Because of the eco-
nomic advantage of 'squeezing', most GPs will try to avoid
going 'overtime' (longer than the booked time slot), dur-
ing the consultation. However, the greater the capitation
share, that is the percentage of publicly insured patients in
their practice, the bigger the economic need to keep con-
trol of the consultation length. Under capitation condi-
tions, an extra time-investment just generates more work
for the same income, whereas under FFS-conditions, there
might be more of an incentive to conclude the consulta-
tion properly without regarding the time investment. After
all, the patient is paying and it is known that patients
often find consultations too short [16,17]. So, our first
hypothesis (1) is that a large patient list is related to
shorter consultations, and (hypothesis 1a) that this rela-
tionship will be stronger when the capitation share (pro-
portion of publicly insured) is larger.
Our second point of interest concerns waiting time to get
an appointment. Delaying appointments enables GPs to
plan and to spread the work better over the week. In an
economic sense, delaying appointments for longer is
especially attractive under capitation conditions. In addi-
tion, some less severe problems will disappear without
treatment within a few days so that the amount of work
may even fall slightly. Under FFS conditions this is unfa-
vourable; the GP misses some, perhaps relatively simple,
consultations and thus income. So (hypothesis 2), we
expect that large patient lists are associated with longer
waiting time to get an appointment and, (hypothesis 2a)
we expect this relationship to be stronger when the capita-
tion part is larger.
The third relationship to be investigated concerns that
between list size and home visits. Reducing the number of
home visits is profitable under both conditions. Accord-
ingly, we expect a negative relationship between list sizeBMC Health Services Research 2009, 9:39 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/9/39
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and the number of home visits (hypothesis 3). Yet, we
expect this relationship to be stronger with a larger capita-
tion share, because under FFS-conditions GPs are (at least
partly) compensated for the extra time investment [18].
The above outlined expectations all imply some kind of
'strategic behaviour'. A relatively small list size, however,
provides more room for decision-making in this respect.
In other words, GPs with a large list simply have no choice
but to be economical with time. Previous studies showed
that the influence of list size on number of working hours
levels off above a certain point [15,19]. Therefore, we
expect that the relationship between remuneration on the
one hand, and the decisions about how they provide con-
sultations on the other hand, are stronger for GPs with a
relatively small weighted list size than for practices with a
relatively large weighted list size.
Methods
Data
The data we used were derived from the second Dutch
National Survey of General Practice (DNSGP-2) [20].
DNSGP-2 was carried out between 2000 and 2002 among
104 general practices in the Netherlands, comprising 195
GPs and accounting for 165.5 GP full-time equivalents.
These GPs were compared to a national database of all
GPs and they appeared to be representative of the Dutch
GP population with respect to age, sex and urbanisation
[20]. The GPs were primarily selected on basis on the
quality of their electronic medical records. A previous
study showed no differences in practice style between GPs
participating in a registration network and those who are
not [21]. Data were collected using questionnaires, video-
taped consultations and routine data collection. The study
was carried out in keeping with Dutch legislation on pri-
vacy. Compliance with privacy regulations was approved
by the Dutch Data Protection Authority. According to
Dutch legislation, neither obtaining informed consent
nor approval by a medical ethics committee was obliga-
tory for this observational study.
Since the DNSGP-2 contains many different datasets, we
will briefly describe the six datasets used. These datasets
are also summarised in Table 1; Westert et al. have
described the methods and data collection of the DNSGP
in greater detail [20].
Videotaped consultations
142 of the GPs (73%) in the DNSGP-2 gave permission
for the consultations in their surgery to be videotaped.
These GPs were likewise representative of the Dutch GP
population with respect to age, sex and urbanisation [22].
Of the patients, 88% gave informed consent to participate
in the study. Approximately 20 consultations of every GP
were recorded. To avoid bias due to the camera, the first
five consultations were excluded. In total, 2,095 video-
taped consultations were observed afterwards and used
for research on communication [22,23]. In this study we
will only use the clocked consultation length.
GP questionnaire
All GPs received a postal questionnaire covering a range of
topics about their work. The response to this question-
naire was 96%, with 184 GPs (94%) answering the ques-
tions that we used for the waiting time to get an
appointment.
Electronic medical records
All participating GPs kept electronic medical records of all
contacts. Because the type of contact was not always rou-
Table 1: Datasets of DNSGP-2, used in this study
Dataset Variables used Identifiers N
Videotaped consultations Consultation length Unique patient code 1,967 consultations
Unique GP code
Postal GP questionnaire Waiting time to get an appointment Unique GP code 184 GPs
Recording of type of contact in 
Electronic Medical Files (six weeks)
Home visit (yes or no) Unique patient code 67,709 consultations
Unique GP code
Practice administration Insurance status Unique patient code 399,068 patients
Sex of patients
Age of patients
List size
Zip code 
(for selection of deprived areas)
Patient questionnaire Self-rated health Unique patient code 294,999 patients
Database of all participating GPs in 
DNSGP
Age of GP Unique GP code 195 (GPs who participated in DNSGP)
Sex of GP Unique practice code
Practice typeBMC Health Services Research 2009, 9:39 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/9/39
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tinely registered, all GPs were asked to record this aspect
during a six-week period for all contacts. The result was a
successful data collection of 67,709 contacts for 122 GPs
in 83 practices.
Practice administration
The practice administration of all participating practices
contains a short list of all patient characteristics on the
practice list: sex, date of birth, insurance status and postal
code. There were almost 400,000 patients in the DNSGP-
2.
Patient questionnaire
A brief written questionnaire was sent to all listed
patients. This included some characteristics which are not
registered in the practice administration, such as self-rated
health. The response was 76.5%.
National database of all GPs
Since 1974, NIVEL has been keeping a national database
of all GPs. This database is updated yearly with new grad-
uates. In this database some basic characteristics are col-
lected such as date of birth, sex, graduation year etc. The
database contained data of 7,763 GPs, of who 195 partic-
ipated in the DNSGP-2.
All these files were merged using patient, GP and practice
codes as unique identifiers.
Measures
Dependent variables
- Length of consultations
This variable was based on the videotaped consultations.
The consultation length was measured using a stopwatch,
starting at the first verbal expression and stopping after the
last verbal expression. Interruptions to the consultation
were subtracted from the total consultation length. After
listwise deletion, 1,967 consultations were left.
- Waiting time to get an appointment
This variable was measured in the GP-questionnaire with
the question: 'How long does it take to get an appoint-
ment with you?' GPs were asked to give two answers to
this question: firstly when the patient calls in the morn-
ing, and secondly, when the patient calls in the afternoon.
Response categories were: same day; next day; later. Since
these answers can be arranged in a logical, hierarchical
order, it was possible to create a Guttman-scale [24]. The
answers were recoded into a scale from 0, indicating the
same day, even when a patient calls in the afternoon, to 3,
indicating a later date, even when the patient calls in the
morning. Of all GPs, 8% scored 0; 64% scored 1; 24%
scored 2; and 4% scored 3. A previous study showed that
this scale correlates significantly (R = 0.54) with other
aspects of accessibility that patients report from these
practices [25]. This concerns mainly regular appointments
for office consultations and not the emergency cases.
Office consultations include approximately 75% of all
contacts [26].
-Whether or not patients received a home visit
This is a dichotomous variable. For all contacts between a
GP and a patient this variable has either 0, no home visit,
or 1, a home visit, as an outcome. For this variable, elec-
tronic medical records were used.
List size
List size was used as an indicator for workload. List size
was computed by averaging the number of patients on the
list at the beginning of the year and at the end (based on
practice administration). This list size at practice level was
divided among the GPs within one practice in proportion
to their full-time equivalents (FTE), which was derived
from the GP questionnaire. For example, a practice has a
mid-time population of 5000, two full-time working GPs
(1 FTE) and one GP who works 0.5 FTE, the full-time
working GPs have a list size of 2000 and the part-timer,
one of 1000. As was mentioned in the introduction, some
patients incur a higher care demand than others. List size
is especially higher for older patients and in deprived
areas. To take these differences into account, we trans-
formed list size into a 'weighted list size'. The weight of a
patient was:
1 for patients younger than 65 years and not living in a
deprived area,
1.18 for patients older than 65 years and not living in a
deprived area,
1.10 for patients younger than 65 years living in a
deprived area,
1.28 for patients older than 65 years living in a deprived
area.
To compute the weighted list size, the number of patients
was multiplied with these weights and added up. These
weights are the same as those used for the differentiation
in capitation fees [27]. The definition of deprived areas
was derived from the literature on the identification of
these areas in the U.K., particularly the Jarman-index [28].
The Dutch identification of deprived areas is based on the
average income level and unemployment rate [29]. To
make the interpretation of coefficients and of the intercept
easier, this variable was divided by 1000 and centred
around the mean.BMC Health Services Research 2009, 9:39 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/9/39
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Independent variables at patient level
The following variables were derived from the practice
administration:
- Insurance status, was coded as 0 (privately insured) or 1
(publicly insured)
- Age (years)
- Sex, coded as 0 (male) or 1 (female)
-Self-rated health, (0 = very good to moderate) (1= bad or
very bad)
This variable was derived from the patient question-
naire and was originally measured on a scale from 1
(very good) to 5 (very bad); this was recoded as a
dichotomous variable. Scores 1 to 3 were recoded as 0,
and scores 4 and 5 (bad and very bad) as 1.
Independent variables at GP level
-Age and sex of GP
Age and sex of all participating GPs were derived from the
national database of GPs.
Independent variables at practice level
-Proportion of publicly insured patients
To compute this variable, the insurance status of all
listed patients in the practice administration was
aggregated to practice level. The proportion indicates
the share of the patient population for which GPs
receive a capitation payment. This variable was also
centred around its mean.
-Degree of urbanisation and practice type
These variables were derived from the national data-
base of GPs and were based on the addresses of the
practices.
- Proportion of patients with low self-rated health.
The health status of all patients was asked about in the
patient questionnaire and was aggregated to practice
level on basis of the valid response.
Means and standard deviations of all variables used are
presented in table 2.
Statistical analyses
To explore the relationships between the most important
variables, correlations were computed (Pearson's R). Mul-
tilevel regression and logistic multilevel regression analy-
ses were carried out to assess the hypothesized
relationships. The analyses were carried out with the soft-
ware package MLwiN.
Analysis of consultation length
To analyse consultation length, we used a multilevel
model with three levels: contacts (1), GPs (2) and prac-
tices (3). No separate patient level was included because
more contacts with the same patient rarely occur in the
data. This means that level 1 is a contact level as well as a
patient level. First, a null-model was estimated. This
empty model showed a statistically significant variance at
practice level (5% of all variance; p < 0.005) and a signif-
icant variation at GP level (5%; p < 0.05). Second, the
explanatory variables and the other practice, GP and
patient characteristics were added to the model, including
two interaction variables: (list size * proportion of
patients with public insurance) and (list size * insurance
status). These interaction variables are necessary to test
hypotheses 1a, 2a and 3a concerning the effect of the pro-
Table 2: Mean and standard deviation of used variables
mean Sd
Dependent
Consultation length (contact level) 9.66 4.64
Waiting time to get an appointment (GP level) 1.18 0.59
Home visit (contact level) 8%
Independent
Practice level
% publicly insured (per practice)1 65% 4,00
% self-rated health low (per practice)1 18% 4.26
Practice type
Single-handed 34%
Dual practice 16%
Group 50%
Urbanisation
Urban 44%
Suburban 20%
Rural 36%
GP level
List size 2017 639
Weighted list size 2080 651
Age 46.08 6.46
Sex (female) 24%
Patient/contact level
Age 43.85 23.52
Sex (female)2 60%
Insurance type patient (1 = public)2 73%
Self-rated health low1 20%
1 All listed patients
2 Since the lowest level concerns contacts, these data only contain 
individual data of patients that visited their GP during a six-week 
period. Consequently, there are more women, publicly insured and 
people with relatively low self-rated health than in the whole 
population because these categories contact their GP more often.BMC Health Services Research 2009, 9:39 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/9/39
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portion of publicly insured on the relationship between
list size and the outcome measures. The difference
between the two interaction variables is that the first
measures an effect of a patient population characteristic,
irrespective of whether an individual patient is publicly or
privately insured; whereas the second interaction variable
measures the effect of the insurance status of a specific
patient when this patient contacts the GP.
The analysis of waiting time to get an appointment
For this variable, (multilevel) regression models were esti-
mated with the GP as level 1 and practice as level 2. In the
first step, a null-model was estimated. This model showed
an intraclass-correlation of 50% (p < 0.005).
In the second step, we added the other practice and GP
characteristics to the model.
Analysis of home visits: Yes or No
Home visit (yes or no) was measured at a contact level and
has a dichotomous outcome. Therefore, we estimated a
logistic multilevel regression model with four levels: con-
tacts (1); patients (2); GPs (3); and practices (4).
We estimated four logistic models, starting with a null
model with random intercept. This intercept could vary
between patients, GPs and practices. The model showed a
statistically significant variance at patient level, practice
level and GP level (all p < 0.005). The major part of the
variation appeared to be between patients (92% of level 2,
3 and 4 together). In the second step we added the other
variables, including the two interaction terms.
Since in our last hypothesis we stated that the relationship
between remuneration on the one hand, and the deci-
sions about how they provide consultations on the other
hand, are stronger for GPs with a relatively small weighted
list size than for practices with a relatively large weighted
list size, we conducted six additional analyses in order to
find out whether the coefficients of list size and remuner-
ation differ according to practice list size. This means that
the final models for all of the three variables were
repeated for GPs with smaller (below median) and larger
(above median) weighted lists. All models were also esti-
mated without the interaction variables. Since we are
especially interested in the interaction between list size
and remuneration, these models are not reported in the
tables, but will be discussed in the text where relevant.
Results
Correlations
Table 3 shows the correlations between the dependent
variables, list size and the proportion of patients in the
population for which GPs receive a capitation payment.
List size is negatively correlated with consultation length
(-0.09). The number of home visits is negatively related to
the length of the waiting time to get an appointment, (R =
-0.18). Consultation length is weakly but statistically sig-
nificantly correlated with the proportion of patients for
which GPs receive a capitation payment.
Models with explanatory variables
Models with explanatory variables are shown in table 4. In
the model for consultation length, the main effect of list
size is negative and statistically significant. This coefficient
represents the relationship between list size and consulta-
tion length subject to the condition that the proportion of
publicly insured is average and the patient is privately
insured. The interaction of list size and proportion of pub-
licly insured shows no significant coefficient. However,
when the interaction variables were left out, the coeffi-
cient of list size dropped to -0.74 and was no longer statis-
tically significant. Older people and those with low self-
rated health get longer consultations. At practice level, low
self-rated health is negatively related to consultation
length.
In the model for waiting time to get an appointment, no
significant relationships were found.
No significant relationships were found between the like-
lihood of a home visit and practice, and GP characteristics
(including list size). Several patient characteristics, how-
ever, show statistically significant coefficients. Women
have a higher chance of a home visit than men: exp-b =
1.3; and age and low self-rated health are positively
related to the chance of a home visit. Especially the poor
self rated health makes a major difference: exp-b = 1.57.
The interaction between insurance status and list size is
Table 3: Correlations between dependent variables, list size and % capitation payment (Pearson's R)
12 3 4
1 List size (weighted)
2 % Capitation payment (publicly insured) -0.03
3 Consultation length -0.09** -0.06*
4 Waiting time to get an appointment -0.08 0.07 0.03
5 Number of home visits -0.09 -0.02 -0.13 -0.18*
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01 (two-tailed)BMC Health Services Research 2009, 9:39 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/9/39
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not statistically significant. Leaving out the interaction
variables made little difference.
Smaller and larger practices
Table 5 shows the models 1, 2 and 3 again and the same
analyses for GPs with smaller (model 1b, 2b, 3b) and
larger practices (model 1c, 2c, 3c). A comparison between
smaller and larger practices yielded some remarkable dif-
ferences.
In the separate analyses of consultation length, a negative
main effect for list size was found in small as well as in
large practices, but only in the latter was this coefficient
statistically significant. This negative correlation also
remained in a model without interaction variables (coef-
ficient of -1.96). No significant interaction effects were
found. Furthermore, the variables practice type and urbani-
sation  show remarkably different coefficients between
small and large practices. In the small practices, the con-
sultations appear to be shorter in the suburban and rural
areas, which is not the case among the large practices.
Among the small practices, dual practices have longer
consultations, whereas this coefficient is negative for the
larger practices.
The models for waiting time to get an appointment also
differ between smaller and larger practices. There is a neg-
ative effect of the interaction between list size and propor-
tion of patients who are publicly insured among GPs with
small practices. To clarify the interpretation, this relation-
ship is displayed in figure 1. The figure shows the correla-
tions between list size and waiting time to get an
appointment, for small practices with 55% publicly
insured patients (which is 10% below average), and small
practices with 75% publicly insured patients, (10% above
average) and small practices with an average percentage of
Table 4: Regression of remuneration, list size and other practice, GP, and patient characteristics on consultation length, waiting time 
to get an appointment, and home visit (yes/no) (multilevel regression analysis and logistic regression analysis)
Consultation length
(minutes)
Waiting time to get an appointment
(0 through 3)
Home visit
yes (1)/no (0)
BB E x p - B
Intercept 11.794 0.904 0.002
Practice characteristics
Proportion of publicly insured (capitation share) 0.034 0.000 1.007
Proportion self-rated health low -0.192** 0.022 0.994
Urbanization (ref = urban)
Suburban -0.970 0.011 1.168
Rural -1.957** -0.019 1.405
Practice type (ref = solo)
Dual -0.248 0.066 1.097
Group -0.071 0.289 0.777
GP characteristics
Age 0.020 -0.005 1.002
Sex (female) 0.157 0.002 0.963
Weighted list size -1.014* 0.065 0,967
Weighted list size *
proportion of publicly insured
0.002 -0.004 1.008
Patient characteristics
Insurance status (1 = public) -0.465 0.999
Age 0.032** 1.061**
Self-rated health low 1.065** 1.570**
Sex (female) 0.327 1.300**
Weighted list size *
public insurance
0.400 0.900
Variance components
Practice level 0.943 0.176 0.086
Reduction compared to null model 38% 14% 60%
GP level 1.048 0.209 0.102
Reduction compared to null model 0% 0% 32%
Patient level 18.225 2.130
Reduction compared to null model 5% 46%
N 1,967 184 67,709
* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01BMC Health Services Research 2009, 9:39 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/9/39
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publicly insured. The figure refers to male GPs in urban
group practices; all other variables were given average
scores. Roughly, waiting times get longer with the list size
in practices with relatively few publicly insured patients,
but shorter in practices with relatively more patients who
are publicly insured.
In the models for home visits (3), we also found a signif-
icant interaction between list size and the proportion of
publicly insured patients in the small practices (3b). This
relationship is displayed in figure 2. It shows that the like-
lihood of a home visit rises with increasing list size when
the proportion of publicly insured patients is relatively
small. When this proportion is relatively high, this likeli-
hood decreases with an increasing list size. Yet, it must be
noted that the overall chance of a home visit is small in
the Netherlands.
Although the sex of the GP has no significant coefficient
in the overall model (3a), the models for small and large
practices show remarkably different results: a positive
odds ratio for female GPs among the small practices and
a negative odds ratio among the large practices.
Discussion and conclusion
The main questions in this article were: a) how is list size
related to consultation length, waiting time to get an
appointment, and the likelihood that GPs conduct home
Table 5: Regression of remuneration, list size and other practice, GP, and patient characteristics on consultation length, waiting time 
to get an appointment, and home visit (yes/no) controlled for practice, GP and patient characteristics. 
Consultation length Waiting time to get an appointment (0 through 3) Home visit no (0)/yes (1)
1a 1b 1c 2a 2b 2c 3a 3b 3c
All Small list Large list All Small list Large list All Small list Large list
B B B B B B Exp-B Exp-B Exp-B
intercept 11.794 13.597 6.196 0.904 1.789 -0.045 0.002 0.004 0.002
Practice characteristics
Proportion of publicly 
insured (capitation share)
0.034 0.057 -0.014 0.000 0.012 -0.015 1.007 0.998 1.017*
Proportion of self-rated 
health low
-0.192** -0.204* -0.097 0.022 -0.009 0.066** 0.994 0.978 0.986
Urbanisation (ref = urban)
Suburban -0.970 -1.649* 0.242 0.011 -0.096 0.305 1.168 0.655 1.282
Rural -1.957** -1.957* -0.411 -0.019 -0.547* 0.676** 1.405 1.332 1.21
Practice type (ref = solo)
Dual -0.248 2.038* -1.308* 0.066 -0.017 -0.096 1.097 0.723 1.038
Group -0.071 1.512 -0.338 0.289 0.077 0.141 0.777 0.412** 1.261
GP-characteristics
Age 0.020 -0.034 0.084* -0.005 -0.003 -0.006 1.002 0.992 1.007
Sex (female) 0.157 -0.651 1.306 0.002 0.053 -0.157 0.963 1.368 0.416**
Weighted list size -1.014* -1.346 -2.663* 0.065 -0.046 0.218 0.967 0.842 0.724
Weighted list size *
proportion of publicly 
insured
0.002 0.057 0.036 -0.004 -0.041* 0.012 1.008 0.874** 0.966
Patient characteristics
Insurance status (1 = public) -0.465 -0.451 -0.451 0.999 1.094 0.949
Age 0.032** 0.031** 0.033** 1.061** 1.066** 1.059**
Self-rated health low 1.065** 1.084** 1.077** 1.570** 1.423** 1.660**
Sex (female) 0.327 0.537 0.132 1.300** 1.302* 1.230**
Weighted list size *
public insurance
0.400 1.263 1.283 0.900 1.132 0.975
Variance components
Variance practice level 0.943 0.000 1.884 0.176 0.151 0.086 0.086 0.004 0.000
Variance GP level 1.048 1.280 0.000 0.209 0.218 0.207 0.102 0.090 0.116
Variance patient level 18.225 18.982 17.297 2.130 2.390 2.130
N 1,967 996 971 184 92 92 67,709 22,430 45,279
* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01
Overall, smaller and larger practices (multilevel regression analysis and logistic regression analysis).BMC Health Services Research 2009, 9:39 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/9/39
Page 9 of 11
(page number not for citation purposes)
visits? And b) to what extent are the relationships between
list size and these three variables affected by remunera-
tion?
Our results indicate that list size is negatively related to
consultation length, especially among GPs with relatively
large lists. A correlation between list size and waiting
times and list size and likelihood of a home visit was only
found for GPs with small practices. These correlations are
modified by the proportion of patients for whom GPs
receive capitation fees. The associations are, however, rel-
atively weak compared to correlations with patient char-
acteristics such as sex, age and health.
Our theoretical approach led us to assume that, in general,
a large patient list would be associated with shorter con-
sultations, longer waiting times and fewer home visits. We
expected these correlations for all GPs, because these are
ways to manage patient care and maintain control of their
workload. We expected these correlations to be stronger
when the financial consequences are more favourable.
These financial consequences are determined by the share
of the population for which GPs receive payment based
on FFS. We also expected these interaction effects to be
stronger in smaller practices than in larger practices,
because small lists provide more room for decision-mak-
ing.
The consultation length correlates negatively with list size.
This finding was in line with hypothesis 1. The relation is,
however, weak: a difference of approximately 1 minute
per 1000 listed patients. Previous studies also found a
negative relationship between consultation length and
measures of workload [2,30]. Hypothesis 1a was not con-
firmed: the relationship between list size and consultation
length seems not to be affected by remuneration. Contrary
to our expectations, the relationship between list size and
consultation length was stronger and only statistically sig-
nificant among GPs with large practices. In most studies
where the relationship between workload and consulta-
tion length was investigated, list size was used as work-
load measure. In these studies, conflicting results have
been reported (see for an overview Wilson et al. and Hof-
man-Okkes [16,31]). Many of these studies showed that
consultation length is not, or only weakly, related to list
size. It has been shown that some other doctor-related fac-
tors affect consultation length positively; these include a
positive attitude towards the profession and job satisfac-
tion. Mechanic found that those with a high level of job
satisfaction were prepared to 'let the patient talk for half
an hour or more' [16,32]. Another interesting finding is
that low self-rated health is positively related to consulta-
tion length. The proportion of patients with low self-rated
health is, however, negatively related to consultation
length. This probably illustrates the effect of choices that
have to be made with respect to the division of time
between patients. Obviously, patients with bad health
often require more time, but when there are many of
them, there is less time per patient.
The hypothesis (2) that the list size lengthens the waiting
time to get an appointment, was not confirmed. The inter-
action-coefficient that we found is in contrast with our
hypothesis (2a). We did find a significant interaction
The relationship between list size and waiting time to get an  appointment for small practices with 55% publicly insured  patients, small practices with 75% publicly insured patients  and small practices with 65% publicly insured patients (aver- age) (male GP in urban group practice, all other variables are  average) Figure 1
The relationship between list size and waiting time 
to get an appointment for small practices with 55% 
publicly insured patients, small practices with 75% 
publicly insured patients and small practices with 
65% publicly insured patients (average) (male GP in 
urban group practice, all other variables are aver-
age).
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The relationship between list size and likelihood of a home  visit for small practices with 55% publicly insured patients,  small practices with 75% publicly insured patients and small  practices with 65% publicly insured patients (average) (male  GP in urban group practice, female, publicly insured patient  with good self-rated health, other variables are average) Figure 2
The relationship between list size and likelihood of a 
home visit for small practices with 55% publicly 
insured patients, small practices with 75% publicly 
insured patients and small practices with 65% pub-
licly insured patients (average) (male GP in urban 
group practice, female, publicly insured patient with 
good self-rated health, other variables are average).
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between list size and proportion of publicly insured only
among the GPs with small practices. This negative interac-
tion indicates that waiting times tend to become shorter
with increasing list size when there is a high proportion of
publicly insured patients. This finding is remarkable. After
all, longer waiting times seem to be more attractive in the
case of publicly insured patients for whom GPs only
receive capitation fees.
Home visits are more often carried out with female
patients, older patients and patients who are relatively
unhealthy. Hypothesis 3 was not confirmed. The finding
that home visiting is not related to the list size in our total
model is in line with previous findings [33]. In the smaller
practices we found a slight negative interaction between
list size and the proportion of publicly insured patients.
This means that the likelihood of a home visit rises with
increasing list size when the proportion of publicly
insured is relatively low. This is in line with our hypothe-
sis (3b). Patient characteristics seem to be the most impor-
tant determinants of home visiting rates. Especially those
with a poor self rated health have a substantially higher
chance to be visited. Obviously, people with a poor health
more often suffer with complaints that restrained them to
go to the practice. Calnan and Butler did find a negative
relationship between list size and home visiting rates, but
did not take population characteristics into account [19].
We hypothesized that the relationship between remuner-
ation on the one hand, and indicators for decisions about
how they provide consultations on the other hand, are
stronger for GPs with a relatively small list size than for
those with a relatively large list size. This is partly con-
firmed by our findings. In the analyses of waiting times
and of home visits we did find a significant interaction
among the small practices and not among the large prac-
tices. A possible explanation for the finding that remuner-
ation seems only to have a small influence might be that
Dutch GPs earn a high income compared to most other
countries, and therefore, earning enough income is not
much of an issue [34,35]. Another explanation for the
absence of the expected relationships is that the influence
of their payment is small compared to the other factors
that influence GPs' behaviour such as medical assess-
ments and the care for the patients' wellbeing. It is also
possible that the workload of most GPs is simply so high
that they cannot afford to base their decisions on remu-
neration factors. After all, beyond a certain limit, all GPs
will try to reduce their workload no matter whether the
extra work is compensated for or not. Another explana-
tion could be that the effect of factors related to morbidity
was insufficiently taken into account. Publicly insured
patients are on average less healthy than privately insured
patients. We tried to correct for this by controlling for self-
rated health but more detailed corrections may be possi-
ble.
Some shortcomings of this study include the following.
First, the design of the study is not ideal for investigating
coping behaviour. Obviously, since the study is cross-sec-
tional, we can only talk about statistical relations, and real
causal relations cannot be shown. Yet, theoretically
grounded hypotheses that are tested in a cross-sectional
study are at least strong indications for causal relations.
Furthermore, as in all studies that use routinely collected
data, the data can be biased by the recording behaviour of
GPs. However, the type of data that we used contains rel-
atively simple data such as consultation type (home visit,
office consultation). Moreover, the data collection was
intensively controlled by field workers. In our analyses of
the likelihood of a home visit, we dichotomised the
dependent variable into 1 (home visit) and 0 (office con-
sultation or telephone consultation). Another way to ana-
lyze this is to estimate a multinominal model which
compares the three types of contacts. This would be an
interesting approach for future research. However, we
were especially interested in home visits, because we
assume that this issue is of greater importance for patients.
It is very unlikely that a GP would refuse an office consul-
tation if the patient asks for it, but with regard to the deci-
sion to conduct a home visit, GPs are much stricter. A last
shortcoming that should be pointed out concerns the
waiting time to get an appointment. We asked this in a
GP-questionnaire, which means that we only have one
measure per GP. Obviously, it would be better to ask
patients after every consultation. Yet, as we mentioned
earlier, this measure appeared to correlate strongly with
other measures for accessibility that were measured on
patient level. This indicates that the answers GPs gave
were fairly reliable.
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